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 Forward 
The present Annual Survey presents the wide range of activities of the National 
Insurance Institute of Israel (NII) in 2004 – payment of benefits and collection of 
insurance contributions, formulation of social policy and research.  
The first chapter describes benefit payments in 2004, in view of the social policy of 
the government in the past three years, and describes overall welfare expenditure in 
Israel in an international perspective. It also surveys some social aspects of the public 
expenditure policy and its implications on cash benefits, health and education services 
as well as the income tax reform. 
The second chapter presents the picture of poverty and income inequality in Israel in 
2004, focusing this time on the trends that characterized Israel in the nineties in 
comparison to selected Western countries. Updated findings are presented on the 
scope of poverty according to the expenditure approach. 
Special chapters are devoted to developments in the income support system to the 
working-age population (Chapter Three), in collection of national and health insurance 
contributions (Chapter Four), and in the main insurance branches (Chapter Five). 
Several chapters include boxes on topics in Israel’s public agenda, or on the 
international experience in certain fields. The Survey also includes an English 
summary of the first chapter and of the chapter on trends in poverty and income 
distribution. 
The Survey includes three Appendices: an Appendix of Publications – summaries of 
research reports and surveys published by the Research and Planning Administration 
in 2004 – an Insurance Branch Table Appendix and a Poverty and Inequality Table 
Appendix.  I extend my thanks to the employees of the Research and Planning Administration 
who assisted in the preparation of the Survey and bringing it to print, and particularly 
to Mia Orev-HaTal, who carried out the linguistic editing and to Sarah Gargi for 
translation of the Introduction to English.. Special thanks are due to Or-el Abutbul and 
Nira Amir, who bore the burden of the typing, for work carried out with willingness, 
initiative and devotion. 
Leah Achdut 
Deputy Director-General for Research and Planning Preface 
By the Director General 
The first buds of economic recovery appeared in 2004; the standard of living – in 
terms of GDP per capita and wages – rose, employment expanded and there was even 
a slight decline in unemployment. However, not all population groups enjoyed the 
fruits of this growth.  The 2002-2003 turnabout in the government’s social policy 
continued to leave its mark on the national insurance (social security) system in 2004 
as well. Child allowances continued to be slashed, the depth of the cut in the income 
support benefit was felt even more intensely, and the value of pensions to the elderly, 
widows and disabled remained frozen. Benefit payments continued to shrink both in 
real terms and as a share of the GDP: within a two-year period – 2002-2003 – they lost 
1.4 GDP percentage points (1.2 without reserve service benefits), and relative to the 
GDP they withdrew to their 1997 value.  In real terms, benefit payments are about 
11% lower in 2004 than they were in 2001. 
The data in the present Survey show once again that the welfare system in Israel is not 
exceptionally generous in an international perspective, not even in the 2001 peak year, 
and certainly not in 2004. The international comparison also reveals that Israel is one 
of the “leading” countries in the scope of poverty and disposable income gaps.   
Today’s picture of poverty and inequality in income distribution, not yet fully 
reflecting the effects of the new social policy, is gloomy enough as it is. The rate of 
poor families soared to 18%, while the proportion of poor children shot up to about 
31%.  The NII benefits absorbed the deepest cuts, but the other social services, 
particularly the national health services, were struck as well, hurting mainly the weak 
sectors of Israeli society. At the same time, the income tax reform improved the 
situation of the well-off sectors. The reform did not provide an adequate solution to 
the economic distress of the low-wage earners; the increase of the tax burden by 
means of a reduction or cancellation of tax benefits (development towns) or by a permanent freeze in the value of credit points, shall erode the disposable income of the 
families that already suffered from a deep cut in their benefit, particularly their child 
allowances. 
Most agree that the economic growth in Israel — which we hope will continue — will 
not benefit the entire population.  Many too share our doubt regarding the truth of the 
declaration that only work, and not benefits, is the sole solution to society’s ills.  True, 
work is of utmost importance, but it is not always sufficient to guarantee an adequate 
standard of living, particularly when one is working at low wages.  Even if we agree 
that whoever goes out to work is extricated from poverty, it is still our obligation to 
assist those families at the threshold of poverty, as well as those who do not work due 
to unemployment, illness or old age. 
The new legislation changed the face of the NII benefit system, and its effects will be 
felt even more strongly in the coming years. It was approved as a result of budgetary 
pressure during an economic recession, but as time passes it becomes ever more clear 
that to a large extent it reflects the perception of the policy makers regarding the 
character of the welfare state in Israel, and the role of the NII.  The 2005 Economy 
Arrangements Law bears testimony to this: despite the growth of the economy, the 
role of the State in insuring its citizens against economic contingencies is being eroded 
(benefits to persons injured at work), while the independent status of the NII is being 
endangered. The government decision to lower (gradually, until 2009) the NII 
contributions paid by employers will tighten the Institute’s dependence on the 
Treasury. Furthermore, it will lessen State receipts, and the budget deficit may lead to 
additional pressure to cut expenditure on benefits and other social services.  When the 
process is over, the reduction will amount to about NIS 3.2 billion annually, in 2004 
prices – in addition to the lowering of income tax by an amount that will reach about 
NIS 9 billion in 2006. When I first took up my position as Director General of the National Insurance 
Institute, the picture described above led me to re-examine the main goals of the NII 
programs as well as the status of the NII relative both to the government and the 
insured public, and to formulate a plan of action in order to advance these goals.  Parts 
of this plan of action are necessary to rehabilitate existing programs that do not 
adequately meet the needs of their target populations or to build new systems of 
assistance to solve problems that have arisen due to present labor market 
circumstances. Other parts of the plan are needed to help the NII work more efficiently 
and to improve its services, so that we may increase take-up of rights without allowing 
for exploitation of the system.  I have therefore set up a number of committees 
comprised of both NII employees  and outside experts in various fields.  After several 
months of research and deliberations, these committees have submitted their 
recommendations. The preface to the NII Annual Survey of 2004 is a fitting 
opportunity to share with the public a brief summary of the results of the committees’ 
work.  
The committee for examining the status of the NII formulated a series of 
recommendations for action on the part of the NII both as an insurance system and as 
an independent corporation.  The committee recommended determining socio-
economic goals and a policy of social insurance to guarantee a security net to those in 
distress or economic crisis.  Furthermore, it recommended classifying the benefits into 
two clusters, each cluster with its own rules of activity: an insurance cluster to include 
the core benefits of the NII, for which contributions are collected, and a social cluster, 
comprising the non-contributory benefits financed entirely by the State Treasury. In 
order to guarantee stability in the insurance cluster and to increase public confidence 
in it, it was recommended that the changes in this cluster be governed by long-range 
considerations and inter-generational principles in order to match receipts to 
expenditure, insofar as possible. The financing of the insurance cluster will be severed 
from short-range constraints of the State budget, and government participation will be defined and limited.  Changes in the insurance cluster will be carried out only after 
consultation with the NII Council — which includes government representatives — 
taking into consideration the actuarial reports conducted every few years, and in 
keeping with the social goals determined by the nation’s leaders.   
In the social cluster, conditions of entitlement and the level of benefit for minimum 
subsistence will be determined, and the benefits shall be re-examined in accordance 
with the social goals and the extent of their attainment.  In order to strengthen the NII 
as an autonomous body, it was recommended to carry out changes in the NII Council 
and in the system of mutual relationships among the Minister of Social Affairs, the NII 
Executive Board, and the members of the Council. 
In the government deliberations on the goals of the economic policy and in the size 
and composition of the State budget, a discussion of social goals and social aspects of 
the budget was notably missing.  The picture presented to the policy makers when 
formulating the budget is therefore not a complete one. The committee for 
examining the social aspects of the State budget recommended presenting the 
government and the Knesset (Parliament) every year with an analysis of the 
implications of the state budget on the social situation, according to accepted 
measures, together with the presentation of the macro-economic forecast. The 
committee also recommended including in the national budget a chapter on its 
expected short-range social implications. The NII will be responsible for conducting 
and presenting a survey of social trends, as well as estimates of the implications of 
budgetary policy on income distribution and on poverty. For this purpose, the NII will 
build an “input-output model”, the social budget being the inputs and the social 
measures being the outputs. In the framework of the committee’s work, the Research 
and Planning Administration prepared a preliminary model that included all the 
changes in the NII benefits, the direct tax reform and the health and education budgets.  Some of the research findings are presented in this Survey, and the NII intends to 
continue to work on and improve the model. 
In view of the structural changes in the labor market, the globalization, the legislation 
harshening conditions of entitlement to unemployment benefits and the sweeping 
reduction in the income support benefit to all recipients, the committee for 
examining the mutual relationship between the NII and the labor market focused 
on low-wage earners and non-employed. The committee recommended introducing a 
program of refundable tax credits to low-wage earners (“negative income tax”), 
similar to that existing in several Western countries. The committee did not content 
itself with a recommendation alone; it proposed two alternatives to the program (at the 
same cost) and methods to implement it. The alternatives proposed and the set of 
considerations on which they were based may undoubtedly serve as a topic for future 
discussion, which we believe many will participate in. The committee recommended 
expanding unemployment coverage to include some of those to whom eligibility for 
unemployment benefits has been ruled out, and to re-examine payment of graded 
unemployment benefits in accordance with period of unemployment or level of 
unemployment in one’s area of residence. Regarding the income support system, it 
was recommended to improve the mechanisms of diagnosing employment potential 
and to provide a higher benefit to those whose capacity to work is limited due to poor 
health — physical or mental. 
The committees that dealt with computerized information systems and the 
improvement of service to the citizen recommended integrating the benefit system 
with the insurance and collection system, so that the information on each client will be 
concentrated and uniform, and the systems would “speak” in one common language. 
They further recommended computerizing the medical boards and  strengthening the 
system of monetary control. In order to implement these recommendations many 
resources are needed both in planning and in computer equipment — and naturally the process will take several years, but it is essential in order to lighten the burden on the 
insured person of providing information to the NII, as well as to increase take-up of 
rights without exploitation of the system. 
This is a welcome opportunity to note the professional work of all the committees and 
to thank all those who took part in their work. I am convinced that the efforts they 
initiated were not in vain.  The research work and recommendations of two of the 
committees have already helped the NII prevent some cuts that the Treasury had 
planned to include in the 2005 Economy Arrangements Law, and to promote some 
important decisions made by the government during the debate on the 2005 budget: an 
increment to the old-age pension for needy elderly and the setting up of a committee to 
examine “negative income tax”. The NII also succeeded in getting the Treasury to 
agree to increase its 2005 administrative budget in order to begin planning the changes 
in the computerized systems and work processes. The tasks and challenges ahead of us 
are many, and entail much intense work and cooperation with the government and the 
Knesset. Our success in strengthening Israel as a welfare state depends not only on the 
support of the country’s leaders, but also on that of the public as a whole. 
Dr. Yigal Ben Shalom 







Chapter  1 
 
Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
Leah Achdut 1.1 Introduction 
The turnabout in the government’s social policy in 2002-2003 left its stamp in the 
social security system of Israel in 2004 as well. NII benefit payments as a percentage 
of the GDP fell to their 1997 level – only slightly higher than their average in 1993-
1996. In three years benefits dwindled by about 1.4 GDP percentage points, down to 
about 7.9% of the GDP. In the survey year, benefit payments in cash and in kind 
decreased in real terms by about 4.5%, and the accumulated decrease since 2001 
amounted to approximately 11.5%
1. In terms of average per capita, benefits were 
eroded at an accumulated real rate of about 16%. 
The decrease in benefit payments in 2004 encompassed all insurance branches (except 
benefits to elderly and the disabled, which rose slightly) as well as the income support 
program. Were it not for the growth in number of recipients, particularly in the central 
NII branches, there would have been a sharper decrease in payments reflecting the 
depth of the benefit cuts and the harshening of conditions of entitlement to benefits. 
Payments of benefits to the working-age population – child allowances, 
unemployment benefits and income support – also declined in 2004. Child allowances 
were slashed again; the harshening of conditions of entitlement to unemployment 
benefits continued to be reflected in the low rate of unemployed persons who attained 
economic security; the cuts in the income support benefit, together with the changes in 
the employment test for this benefit, led to a decline both in the (average) benefit and 
in the scope of recipients. In three years, payments of child allowances plummeted by 
about 40%, of unemployment benefits – by about 43%, and of income support benefits 
– by about 20%. 
                                                      
1   The picture does not essentially change when payments of reserve service benefits are not 
taken into account; in this case, benefit payments were reduced by an accumulated rate of 
10% and lost 1.2 GDP percentage points. E14  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
Both the substantial reductions in child allowances and the payment of an equal 
allowance for every child (by 2009) place Israel very low in the generosity scale of 
benefits for families with children, particularly large families, in comparison with 
many Western countries. At the same time, they strengthen her position as “leading” 
in the scale of poverty among children. Furthermore, the harshening conditions of 
entitlement to unemployment benefits place Israel at the bottom of the scale grading 
Western countries according to parameters of unemployment insurance coverage; in 
2004 only 20% of unemployed persons in Israel were entitled to unemployment 
benefits. A follow-up of unemployment benefit recipients after the legislation shows 
that unemployment insurance grants economic security mainly to those who had 
relatively stable jobs prior to their unemployment. The legislation created a new 
reality, under which many workers who comprise the weak links of the labor market – 
the low-educated, low-wage employees and workers at temporary jobs – were not 
entitled to unemployment benefits after they lost their jobs. 
In the income support scheme, which was – more than any other social security 
scheme – at the focus of public debate, the erosion in the minimum subsistence level 
guaranteed to the weak population groups continued, and will become even stronger 
with the entry of new recipients entitled to the reduced benefit at its low rate. Also, for 
the first time for many years, the number of recipients of income support benefit 
declined — from a peak of about 160,000 early 2003 to about 145,000 towards the 
end of 2004 (although stability characterizes the second half of 2004). This decline 
apparently reflects not only the ruling out of entitlement to about 5,000 (mainly single-
parent) families when the legislation was implemented (June 2003), but also the faster 
pace of exits and the slowdown in the pace of entries to the system. The short period 
of time that has elapsed since the new legislation does not permit an analysis of the 
contribution of the various factors (changes in benefit level and in the income and 
employment tests as well as expansion of employment) that have led to in the decline 
in the number of recipients, nor does it allow us to forecast the long-range Trends of Development in National Insurance  E15 
implications of these changes. Nevertheless, the picture arising from the data is quite 
clear: the decline was concentrated in single-parent families and in couples with 
children, especially couples who had some earnings while in the income support 
system. 
In 2004, for the second straight year, a considerable slowdown was noted in payments 
of disability pension and other benefits paid in the framework of Disability Insurance 
to the working-age population. This development was particularly notable after the 
sharp rise in these payments following the generous additions to disability benefits 
provided in 2000-2002 (in the framework of the agreements with the organizations of 
the disabled). Quite a large share of the growth in total NII benefit payments is 
attributed to the increase in disability payments. The influence of the Retirement Age 
Law in June 2004, which raised the age of entitlement to old-age pension for both men 
and women, already began to be felt in the Old-Age and Survivors’ branch – but 
barely at all in the programs for the working-age population. The strong influence of 
this legislation on the system will be felt only in the coming years. 
The developments in the social security system in 2002-2004 are compared to those 
that occurred in 2001, the year preceding the turnabout in the government’s social 
policy and order of priorities. 2002 to 2004 were not only the years in which most of 
the amendments were actually implemented, but also years of deep recession. In 2001 
the scope of the benefit payments was at a peak,
2 the sharp rise in the average wage in 
1999-2000 was reflected in benefit levels in 2001, while the accumulated influence of 
the expansion of unemployment since mid-1997 was evident in programs such as 
unemployment and income support. The year 2001 also embodies the increments 
gradually provided to the disabled in 1999-2000 as well as those granted for children 
under the “Halpert Law.” However, even in this peak year, Israel’s welfare system in 
general and her system of cash benefits in particular were not exceptionally generous 
                                                      
2   In nominal terms, the scope of payments was at its highest in 2002. E16  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
in an international perspective – although in comparison to 1998,
3 the gap between 
Israel and the average for OECD countries had been reduced. 
Israel is positioned in the 21
st place in the scale grading the 29 OECD countries 
according to public expenditure on welfare relative to the GDP,
4 with the gap between 
this country and the OECD average measuring 2 GDP percentage points: 19.1% as 
compared to 21.2% in 2001. At the same time the gap between Israel and the EU 
average (24%) measured about 5 percentage points. Box 1A presents Israel’s position 
– the 20
th – in the index of cash benefits: In 2001, Israel improved its position on the 
scale of cash benefits to the working age population, as compared to previous years, 
but it should be noted that this improvement reflects not only the greater generosity of 
benefits, but also the considerable expansion of unemployment, placing Israel on a par 
with the countries suffering from the highest unemployment rates. Finally, the 
improvement in Israel’s position on the scale of cash benefits was only a temporary 
one, since the considerable reduction in benefits to the working-age population since 
2002 pushed the country back. Table 1 presents the structure of Israel’s social 
expenditure in 1998-2004, clearly showing the deep cutback in NII cash benefits. 
Total public expenditure on welfare decreased in 2003-2004 by 1.6 GDP points, while 
the expenditure on cash benefits decreased by 1.3 GDP points, with most of the “loss” 
in GDP terms (1.15) coming from the NII cash benefits to the working-age population. 
Cash benefits to the elderly remained more or less without change – about 5.4 GDP 
points; the decrease by 0.2 GDP points in the old-age and survivors pensions and other 
cash benefits to the elderly was set off by the rise in pension payments to civil servants 
(who are actually part of the occupational pension system). A decrease of 0.4 GDP 
points took place between 2002 and 2004 in the scope of in-kind transfers, mainly 
comprised of health and long-term care. 
                                                      
3   See NII 2002-2003 Annual Survey. 
4   See diagrams at beginning of Survey. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E17 
Table 1: Public Expenditure on Welfare, 1998-2004 (percentages of GDP)* 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total  17.73 17.55 17.53 19.05 19.32 18.87 17.68 
Total  cash  benefits  10.46 10.41 10.46 11.57 11.55 11.16 10.33 
Benefits  to  working-age  population  5.60 5.55 5.55 6.14 6.13 5.61 4.98 
NII  4.58 4.49 4.49 5.07 5.03 4.56 4.01 
War  and  hostile  actions  0.53 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.57 
Other**  0.49 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.41 
Benefits  to  the  elderly  4.87 4.85 4.91 5.42 5.43 5.55 5.35 
NII  2.86 2.83 2.83 3.14 3.09 3.06 2.96 
Pension  to  civil  servants  1.59 1.59 1.63 1.79 1.84 1.98 1.97 
Other**  0.41 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.43 
Total  in-kind  benefits  7.27 7.14 7.07 7.48 7.77 7.71 7.34 
Health  and  long-term  care  5.88 5.76 5.73 6.02 6.23 6.27 5.97 
Other  1.39 1.38 1.35 1.46 1.54 1.44 1.37 
*  Source: NII and CBS data, processed by the Research and Planning Administration 
according to OECD classification rules.  
**  Includes benefits to demobilized soldiers, absorption basket and cash benefits as rental 
assistance. 
***  Includes benefits to Nazi victims and cash benefits as rental assistance. 
**** Includes in-kind benefits of NII, local authorities, national institutions, State non-profit 
bodies and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. E18  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
BOX 1A 
Generosity of Cash Benefit System in Israel and in OECD Countries, 2001 
The  cash  benefit  system  is  the  main  pillar  of  public  expenditure  on  welfare  in  all 
Western countries. The scope of these benefits is dependent not only on their level, but 
also on economic and labor market conditions, as well as on the demographic structure 
of  the  population.  The  cash  benefit  system  in  Israel  –  according  to  the  OECD
1 
classification  and  its  most  updated  data  (2001)  –  constitutes  about  61%  of  total 
expenditure on welfare, slightly lower than the EU average (62.5%). 
In the ratio of expenditure on cash benefits to the GDP, Israel is ranked in the 20
th 
place  –  slightly  lower  than  the  OECD  average:  11.6  as  compared  to  12.0  GDP 
percentage points, respectively – and an average of 15 GDP percentage points for the 
EU countries (EU – 15). 
If the benefits to war and hostile action casualties, unique to Israel, and pensions paid 
to civil servants (in most countries, the latter are a part of the private occupational 
pensions, not the state pensions) – are not taken into account, Israel’s expenditure on 
cash benefits falls to 9.1 GDP percentage points. 
A distinction is generally made between cash benefits to the working-age population 
and those granted to the elderly, taking into account population size in each of these 
groups.  In  the  scale  of  countries  according  to  size  of  cash  benefits  per  person  of 
working age relative to GDP per capita, Israel is similar to the EU average and to the 
U.K., but higher than the OECD average In this index, Israel is ranked in the 12
th place 
(or in the 17
th place, if benefits to war and hostile action casualties are not taken into 
account). Israel’s position improved since 1998, reflecting the rise in cash benefits to 
                                                  
1   Government-financed expenditure on welfare, including financing of national institutions and 
non-profit institutions. A problem of inconsistency in the definitions of the various countries 
may arise in the classification of the financing of such institutions, particularly in view of the 
difficulty in separating between government and private financing.  
 Trends of Development in National Insurance  E19 
the working-age population in 1999-2001, but worsened in 2004. In 1998, the cash 
benefits per working-age person relative to the GDP per capita was 6.2, and it rose to 
6.8 in 2001 (when the OECD average remained 5.7), but decreased to 5.5 in 2004.  
A different picture arises from a comparison of expenditure on cash benefits per elderly 
person as a percentage of the GDP per capita. Here Israel is close to the OECD average, 
but  lower  than  the  EU  average.  Excluding  pensions  to  civil  servants  (1.8  GDP 
percentage points in 2001), Israel falls down to the bottom of the scale, to the 27
th 
place. This low position reflects the structure of Israel’s benefit system; it guarantees 
and finances a basic uniform benefit, at a relatively low level, without a supplementary, 
wage-related tier. In this case too, Israel in 2004 is at a lower position than previously.  
Expenditure  on  cash  support  per  elderly  person  (without  pensions  to  civil  servants) 
relative to GDP per capita was 37.1 in 2001 (as compared to an average of 56.1 for 
OECD countries), decreasing to 34.7 in 2004. 
Cash Public Benefits as Percentage of GDP, OECD Countries and Israel, 2001
































































































































































































































 E20  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
Signs of economic recovery in 2004 were noted in the scope of contributions collected 
by the NII, but not in benefits, which continued to decline.  One may surmise that the 
expansion of employment, accompanied by a moderate decrease in the unemployment 
rate, made a certain contribution to the trends noted in the number of benefit recipients 
in the Unemployment and Income Support schemes, and even in the Disability 
scheme.  The relative stability in the average price level prevented further erosion in 
the purchasing power of benefits (those that were not cut, of course), but in view of 
the rise of real wages, the relative situation of benefit recipients got worse.  The value 
of almost all benefits eroded in 2004 relative to the average wage.  This would have 
occurred even if the policy of freezing the nominal value of benefits since December 
2001, and canceling their linkage to the average wage, had not continued, since under 
previous legislation compensation for 2004 wage rises would be provided in 2005. 
Moreover, in light of the erosion in the average wage in 2002-2003, it is now apparent 
that the cancellation of linkage to the average wage has thus far had only a limited 
effect on benefit levels.  The far-reaching implications of this policy on the standard of 
living of benefit recipients will be felt in the coming years, when real wages will 
continue to rise but benefits will be updated in accordance with price rises only.   
The government officials pushing the present socio-economic policy believe in a 
“small” government, and in keeping with this perception they reduced public 
expenditure and cut taxes.  Public expenditure was reduced by means of two 
constraints:  the deficit target of the State budget, which was 4% in 2004, but is to be 
gradually lessened in the next years, and ensuring that public expenditure will not 
increase by more than 1% in real terms – an increase not even sufficient for the natural 
growth of the population. 
The economic growth of 2004 led to an increase in State income from taxes, but in 
order to deflate pressure to raise public expenditure, the Treasury embarked time and 
again on the policy of lowering taxes; in addition to advancing the income tax reform, Trends of Development in National Insurance  E21 
the rates of V.A.T., sales tax and company tax all were lowered, and an agreement was 
signed with the Employers’ Coordination Bureau on lowering national insurance 
contributions collected from employers.  In most cases, the tax reductions will be 
carried out gradually, and will continue in 2006-2007 as well. However, in parallel to 
this policy, a number of measures were taken that actually increase the tax burden on 
certain population groups.  For example, the benefits to persons living in development 
towns and to recipients of early pension were reduced, while the rate of national and 
health insurance contributions collected from the latter was raised.  Also, the 2005 
Economy Arrangements Law proposes to cancel the tax credit point for a non-working 
spouse. Furthermore, the value of the tax credit points will no longer be adjusted (as of 
2005) according to inflation – a measure that will lead to constant erosion in the tax 
thresholds and, in the long run, to a greater tax burden, particularly on low and 
middle-wage earners, as well as on working women with children. 
Both sides of the State budget – the expenditure side and the income side – affect the 
standard of living and welfare of the population, the scope of poverty and the 
economic gaps.  Every year the government debates on the State budget open with a 
review of macro-economic developments in the country and a presentation of the 
forecast for the budgetary year in question as well as the coming years. The 
government uses this forecast when it determines or re-approves the targets of its 
economic policy, as well in its decisions on the size and composition of the budget as 
derived from these targets.  However, notably missing from the government debate is 
a review of the implications of its recent policy on the social situation, or an analysis 
of the social aspects of the budget in question, according to measures accepted in 
Israel and in the world – despite the fact that an analysis on some of the social aspects 
is readily available, being carried out by the NII as well as other bodies. This is at least 
partially due to the fact that social targets are simply not set as part of government 
policy along with the economic targets. E22  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
The reduction of public expenditure is particularly detrimental to those population 
groups that are most in need of or in use of social services, while lowering the taxes on 
labor does not necessarily improve the distribution of net income. Moreover, there is 
no guarantee that economic growth will benefit the entire population, and even among 
those who do enjoy the fruits of this growth, not all enjoy them to the same extent. 
This is particularly true in a period of unbalanced growth, which improves the relative 
situation of highly educated workers and the high-tech sectors, and in this era of 
globalization, which further endangers the jobs and wages of the weak links of the 
labor force. 
The findings presented below in this and other chapters of the Survey show a very 
gloomy picture of the social situation in Israel, and demand a plan of action in 
accordance with defined targets.  Despite the differences in the various approaches as 
to what policy measures should be used to solve the social problems, it is possible to 
at least partially agree on a plan based on the common denominator of all these 
approaches.  It is also possible to bridge some of the differences, leaving the more 
serious ones for another time.  The efforts to convince Treasury officials to halt the 
cuts in the child allowances – even in keeping with the principle of an equal allowance 
for every child – did not succeed.  Furthermore, the chances of increasing the income 
support benefit – even to those limited in their job capacity – seem very slim at the 
moment.  The situation regarding easing conditions of entitlement to unemployment 
benefits is a similar one – although in our opinion, the Treasury did not intend to go so 
far in its policy, and is aware of the wide consensus among professionals and 
academics that unemployment insurance should be strengthened.  The NII prepared 
proposals to expand the coverage of unemployment insurance, one of which – 
applying to daily workers – is presented in the chapter on Unemployment Insurance. 
Assuming that today it will be difficult to improve the economic situation of non-
working families of working age, the focus at this stage is on the elderly and on low-Trends of Development in National Insurance  E23 
wage workers. The discussions preceding the government decisions in the 2005 
budget bore fruit, and the 2005 Economy Arrangements Law includes a proposal to 
raise the minimum income to those elderly entitled to income supplement.  The 
government also decided to set up an inter-ministerial task force to examine the 
possibility of introducing refundable tax credits (negative income tax) to low-wage 
workers – in order to encourage them to join the labor market, or to guarantee more 
adequate wages to part-time or full-time workers.  The experience of other countries 
shows that financial incentives to encourage non-employed to enter the labor market – 
combined with “welfare to work” programs – help achieve worthy goals at the level of 
the individual and the economy as a whole. 
1.2  Social Aspects of Government Policy 
This part of the chapter discusses the social aspects of government policy in recent 
years in three spheres: the evidence accumulated thus far on poverty trends in an 
international perspective; expenditure on health and education services financed by the 
government and their effects on the distribution of in kind transfers embodied in these 
services; and estimates of the effects of the income tax reform in 2003-2006. The 
findings presented are part of the work of a committee that recommended including 
social aspects in government debates on the State budget
5. The committee’s research 
was based on a static short-run analysis; changes in the behavior patterns of 
individuals, families and firms following changes in policy were not taken into 
account. This is a drawback, particularly regarding the reactions of individuals to 
changes in the level of benefits and tax burden, as reflected in labor supply. 
                                                      
5   The committee was appointed by the NII Director General, Dr. Yigal Ben Shalom, and 
headed by Prof. Zvi Zusman and Mrs. Leah Achdut.  The research work, carried out by the 
Research and Planning Administration of the NII, will shortly be published in full as a 
research paper. E24  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
1.2.1 Poverty and Income Distribution in Israel, in an International 
Perspective 
In comparison to other social services – such as health and education – NII benefits 
absorbed the deepest cuts in the framework of the government policy to reduce public 
expenditure in 2002-2004. The findings thus far amassed clearly point to a rise in 
poverty rates in Israel, which were high even prior to the social policy of the past three 
years. It is true that the standard of living of the population at large was eroded due to 
the recession, but the cuts in the benefits – comprising an important element in the 
income of the weak population groups – led to an even deeper erosion in the standard 
of living of these groups. Diagram A shows the sharp fall in 2001-2003 in the standard 
of living of families in the bottom deciles – as expressed in the equivalent disposable 
income. Disposable adjusted income declined in the first and second deciles by about 
17% and 10%, respectively, as compared to a 6% average decline in the population as 
a whole.
6 The rate of poor families soared to 19.3% in 2003, and the upward trend in 
the rate of poor children since the beginning of the recession continued —climbing up 
to 31%. Poverty intensity also deepened, and NII benefits contributed less than in the 
past to a reduction of poverty and income gaps.  These trends are discussed in detail in 
the relevant chapters of the Survey. 
In an international perspective, the Israel of 2003 — and according to estimate, the 
Israel of 2004 as well — continued to “strengthen” her position as a front-runner in 
poverty rates. Diagrams B and C present poverty rates in several Western countries 
that participate in the Luxembourg Study, and concerning which data are available on 
trends in three prints of time: the beginning, middle and end of the ‘90’s.  The 
                                                      
6   A similar picture — though not as sharp — was noted in the average income per family, 
without taking into account family size. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E25 
diagrams show that Israel leads not only in the level of poverty among families but 
also in the rate of growth of poverty in the course of the 90’s.  
The rate of poor families in Israel in the early nineties was about 5 percentage points 
lower than the parallel rate in the U.S.  In the course of the 90’s, however, Israel 
reduced the gap that had been in her favor, thereby distancing herself from countries 
like the U.K. and Canada — to which she had been similar in the early 90’s.  The 
United States, U.K. and Canada, characterized by high poverty rates, succeeded in 
keeping these rates stable (U.S.) or even reducing them (Canada and the U.K.) in the 
course of the 90’s. These three countries were even able to reduce poverty among 
children, and other countries (like Norway and Sweden) managed to keep them stable, 
despite the economic crisis of the 90’s. 
 
Diagram  A: The Real Decrease in Adjusted Disposable Income, by Decile: 
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*  In accordance with the Luxembourg equivalence scale. Use of the Israeli equivalence scale 
produces more or less the same results and the same ranking (see Tables 25-26 in the 
Poverty Table Appendix). 
Diagram  C:  The Change in Rate of Poor Families in Selected Countries, 
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The United States experienced impressive economic growth in the 90’s including a 
rise in the number of workplaces, which helped curb the growth in poverty. Together 
with these developments, the “welfare to work” programs helped poor mothers with 
children integrate into the labor market, and benefits for working families with 
children were strengthened (by means of tax credits). At the same time, those who 
remained poor became poorer due to cuts in their income support benefits. The U.K., 
more than any other country, serves as an example of the turnabout in social policy 
since the mid-90’s, and embarked upon a wide range of policy measures – such as 
minimum wage legislation, support of both working and non-working families with 
children by means of  refundable tax credit programs and “welfare to work” programs 
– all as additional supplementary strata to existing programs. The case of the U.K. is 
worthy of mention also because that country was a pioneer (following Ireland) in 
setting a policy goal of reducing poverty among children and following up on this 
goal. The government of the U.K. committed itself to reducing the rate of poor 
children by 50% by 2010 and to eliminating poverty by 2020. It determined that the 
follow-up would be carried out according to defined and transparent measures, the 
main ones being presented in Box 1B. According to the estimate of researchers, the 
target that was set for 2004-2005 will be achieved. 
Following the U.K., the EU countries agreed (in a summit meeting of the EU in Nice, 
2002) that every country must prove a substantial reduction in poverty rates by 2010, 
and must determine a list of indicators of social distress and exclusion for follow-up –  
in addition to the poverty measure according to the relative poverty line (60% of 
median income). 
Diagram D presents the various countries graded according to the Gini index for the 
distribution of disposable income in the early 2000’s. According to this index too, 
Israel is among the countries suffering most from high inequality. The ranking of the 
countries on this scale is exactly the same as their ranking by the rate of poor families. E28  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
The countries may be divided into two main, homogeneous groups, with Canada in the 
middle.  In the first group, including the U.S., Israel, the U.K. and Italy, the index 
ranges between 0.368 and 0.333, and in the second group, including all the other 
countries, the index ranges between 0.247 and 0.264. The expansion of gaps in 
disposable income in the course of the 90’s characterized all the countries except 
Holland, although the rate of growth in the value of the Gini index in Germany and the 
U.K. was very low. 
Diagram  D:  Gini Index of Distribution of Disposable Income in Selected 













































































Diagram E: The Change in Gini Index of Distribution of Disposabel Income in 
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BOX 1B 
Measures to Achieve the Target of Poverty Reduction — The Case of 
the U.K. 
The U.K. government committed itself to reduce the rate of poor children by 50% by 
2010, and to eliminate poverty by 2020, following up on these targets by means of a 
combination of three measures: 
*  The rate of children living in families having an income under 60% of the median 
income  –  a  relative  poverty  line,  updated  annually  in  accordance  with  income 
distribution data; 
*  The “backstop measure”: the rate of children living in families having an income 
under a “fixed” relative poverty line (the relative poverty line of 1998/9 is updated 
annually for inflation only). 
*  The  measure  of  material  deprivation,  which  records  the  proportion  of  families 
having an income under 70% of the median income who cannot afford to purchase 
a  defined  list  of  goods  and  services  (such  as  quality  housing,  clothing,  social 
activities for the children). 
There is a general consensus that these measures are transparent, and not complicated 
to follow up on. The follow-up on the first two measures will be carried out annually, 
and  on  the  third  measure  –  once  every  few  years.  The  UNICEF
1  report  on  poverty 
among children in developed countries recommends, more or less, adopting the British 
approach to choosing poverty measures and determining a timetable to achieve targets. 
The  authors  of  the  report  state  that  one  should  be  careful  when  using  the  “fixed” 
relative  poverty  measure.  It  represents  a  minimal  test  for  governments,  and  the 
significance of failing to achieve a reduction of poverty according to this measure is that 
poor children do not participate in the fruits of economic progress, or that they are not 
protected in times of economic recession. However, the reduction of poverty according 
to this measure cannot be considered an achievement; rather, the recommendation to 
use it together with the relative measure obligates incoming governments to preserve 
past achievements, while setting goals for an additional reduction in poverty.  Finally, 
the report’s authors believe that the target of lowering the poverty rate under 10% in 
the coming years is a realistic one for most OECD countries. Targets such as these 
require  wide  public  consensus,  so  that  the  commitment  to  achieve  them  will  be 
maintained even when governments change. 
                                                  
1   “Child Poverty in Rich Countries”, Report Card No. 6, UNISEF, Innocenti, Research Centre, 
2005. 
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1.2.2 Government Expenditure on Health and Education and Income 
Distribution 
Government expenditure on health (constituting almost 65% of total national 
expenditure on health) remained more or less unchanged in real terms, given that 
current expenditure is discounted by the civil public consumption index.  Diagram E 
shows that it went up by only 0.2% between 2001 and 2004. The diagram also shows 
that the expenditure on health per capita adjusted to the capitation scale – which takes 
into account the size and composition of the population by age and thus reflecting the 
population’s health needs – decreased by an accumulated rate of about 5.6%
7 between 
2001 and 2004, with most of the decrease occurring in 2002. Under the 2005 budget 
proposal, the erosion in health expenditure per adjusted capita is expected to continue. 
On the other hand, government expenditure on education (constituting about 80% of 
national expenditure on education) grew in real terms by about 4.2%; discounted by 
the increase in the number of pupils in all school sections, it remained almost 
unchanged — an increase of 0.2%.
8 However, an analysis of expenditure per pupil by 
school sections shows that in 2002-2004, preference was give to pre-elementary 
schools and elementary schools, and even more so to higher education, at the expense 
of junior high school and high school.  The 2005 budget proposal changes the picture, 
and the estimated expenditure on education will decline in real terms in all sections 
except for the pre-elementary schools. 
The reduction in public expenditure on “in-kind transfers” as well – inherent in 
government-financed health and education services –  hurts mostly families in the 
lower deciles, since the sums of “in-kind transfer” to these families are higher than to 
families in the upper deciles, and the size of the “in-kind transfer” constitutes a larger 
share of their cash income. 
                                                      
7    After discounting by the Consumer Price Index, the accumulated decrease amounts to 
almost 5.2%. 
8   After discounting by the Consumer Price Index, government-funded expenditure on health, 
as an average per pupil, went up by 0.7%. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E31 
Table 2:  Government Expenditure on Health and Education, 2001-2004,  
    at current prices (NIS million) 
Ecpenditure  2001 2002 2003 2004 
Education*  31,614 31,664 33,190 35,074 
Health**  27,009 28,043 28,488 28,825 
*  The most recent data published by the CBS refer to 2001, and expenditure for 2002-2004 was 
inflated to the budgetary changes in the Ministry of Education and in the higher education. 
**  The expenditure data published by the CBS for 2003 were inflated to 2004 according to the 
budgetary changes in the Ministry of Health, national and health insurance receipts and health 
expenditure of the NII.  













































2002-2004 2002 20032004  
*  Deducting civil public expenditure index. E32  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
1.2.3  The Income Tax Reform 
The income tax reform began to be implemented in 2003 on the basis of the 
recommendations of the Rabinovitz Committee. The committee recommended 
gradually reducing marginal tax rates on income from personal labor in 2003-2008, 
while imposing a tax of 10% to 25% on income from capital.  Since the reform was 
approved by the Knesset, the government decided – in a series of decisions – not only 
to advance the reform and complete it by 2006, but even to carry out a greater tax 
reduction, mainly to low-wage and medium-wage earners. At the same time, under the 
economic policy of 2002-2004, additional changes were introduced in the income tax 
system, which resulted in a heavier tax burden on certain groups. Changes were also 
introduced in the collection of both national and health insurance contributions; these 
will be described below in the chapter on collection by means of the NII.  The present 
part of the chapter will present estimates on the effects of the changes in income tax 
on the distribution of the tax burden as well as on the distribution of disposable 
income. Due to the lack of adequate data on income from capital, the analysis does not 
relate to taxation on capital, and it is therefore necessarily a partial one. 
However, even the very partial data that are presently available on income from 
capital show that the inequality in the distribution of this income is greater than the 
inequality in income from work, and therefore a considerable share of the burden of 
taxation on capital falls on families in the upper part of income distribution. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume than the influence of the reform, in all its components, 
will be less regressive than that of the reduction of taxes on work alone. At the same 
time, it should be remembered that the tax reform is a deficit one, and that the 
expected receipts from taxation on capital are meant to cover only a small share of the 
amount of reductions of the income tax. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E33 
The estimates presented below are related to changes in the tax brackets and in the 
marginal rates for 2003-2006, to a reduction in tax benefits for residence in certain 
areas and to the non-adjustment of the tax credit point (as of 2005). The estimates also 
relate to the lowering of the burden of national insurance contributions paid by low-
wage employees (lowering the reduced rate while raising the regular rate with a zero 
budget), but not to changes in contributions paid by recipients of early pensions and 
by members of the permanent army
9 – nor to the episode of the cancellation of the 
ceiling in the first half of 2003. 
A simulation of the 2003-2006 changes in the income tax was carried out, on the basis 
of the wage, employment and demographic data of the 2003 integrated income survey. 
The 2002 tax system served as the starting point for the evaluation of the changes in 
the tax burden and in net income, thus enabling an estimate of the exclusive influence 
of the reform – although one may claim (as mentioned above) that the reform in itself 
can influence employment or wages.   
The tax reduction inherent in the legislative changes examined – making the tax 
burden both lighter and heavier – will amount to about NIS 9 billion in 2006, in 2003 
terms
10 (about NIS 5.7 billion in 2003-2004 and another approximate NIS 3.3 billion n 
2005-2006).  The average amount of income tax per family will decrease by about 
24%, and the income tax rate out of economic income will decline from 17.2% prior 
to the legislative changes, to 13.1% in 2006. 
The data presented in Table 3 shows that families in the first three deciles (of the total 
population) do not benefit whatsoever from the income tax reduction, while families 
                                                      
9   Due to a lack of data for the simulation of these changes in the Income Survey. 
10   In view of the fact that the volume of income from work in the Income Survey is biased 
downwards by approximately 15%, the amount of the reduction of tax on work will be 
higher.  Due to the progressive structure of the taxation, the amount of the tax reduction 
will be higher than 15%, even if we assume uniform under-reporting in all income levels. E34  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
in the three top deciles will benefit from about 82% of the total amount of the 
reduction by 2006. Families in the top decile alone will benefit from 54% of the tax 
reduction in 2006. That is, the reform will increase the disposable income of the top 
decile by a sum of close to NIS 5 billion in 2006 (in 2003 terms). 
The extent of the progressivity/regressivity of the tax reform is examined, inter alia, 
by its influence on the distribution of disposable income.  The average tax rate did 
decline more in the middle deciles than in the higher deciles, but the greater part of the 
tax reduction serves to increase the disposable income of the higher deciles. Two 
findings show the regressive influence of the reform on the distribution of disposable 
income: firstly, the income of the top deciles rises by higher rates, and secondly, as a 
consequence, their share in total net income also rises.  Diagram F shows the effects of 
the tax reform on the disposable income of families in the various deciles (again, it 
should be stressed that the estimates are based on a given set of wage, employment 
and demographic data). The average income per family will increase by 4.7% from 
2002 (without the reform) to 2006, and while the income of the third decile will grow 
by about 1%, that of the top decile will grow by 8%.  In parallel, the share of the two 
top deciles  in total income will rise from 42.2% before the reform to 43.2% in 2006.  
The rise is notable in the top decile, whose share in total income will rise by about one 
percentage point, while the share of the seven low deciles will decline. 
This development will be reflected in a rise in the Gini index for the distribution of 
disposable income
11 at an accumulated rate of 2.4% – from 0.3675 in 2002 without a 
reform to 0.3764 in 2006. 
 
                                                      
11   In the calculation of the Gini index for 2006, the families were classified according to 
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Diagram  G:  The Accumulated Change in Disposable Income Following the 
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Deciles  
It should be noted that the 2003 amendment regarding NII contribution rates – 
lowering the reduced rate while raising the regular rate – eased the contribution 
burden mainly for low and middle-wage earners.  This measure too did not contribute 
to a rise in the disposable income of families in both low deciles, but it decreased the 
share of the 3
rd to 7
th deciles in total contributions, at the expense of an increase in the 
share of the two top deciles. Thus, the measure served to reduce the regressivity of the 
changes in the income tax system. 
1.3 Benefit  Payments 
In 2004, total NII benefit payments, in cash and in kind – both contributory and non-
contributory — amounted to about NIS 42.8 billion, as compared to 44.9 billion in 
2003 and NIS 47.3 billion in 2002.  These sums also include other payments carried 
out by the NII – mostly for government ministries – the costs of developing services in Trends of Development in National Insurance  E37 
the community and the administrative and operative expenses of the national 
insurance system.
12 
The trend of decrease in NII benefit payments, in real terms, continued in 2004, when 
they decreased by about 4.5%; the accumulated decrease of the past three years 
amounted to about 11.5%. Even if payments of reserve service benefits – which fell in 
2003–2004 (after having risen sharply in 2001–2002) – are not taken into account, the 
accumulated decrease in benefit payments is still notable: 10%. NII benefit payments 
declined to 7.9% of the GDP, as compared to 9.36% in 2001-2002. Were it not for the 
growth in the number of benefit recipients – mainly in the central NII branches – we 
would have noted a steeper decline, reflecting the benefit cuts and the harshening of 
conditions of entitlement to benefits. 
The real decrease in benefit payments in 2004 characterized all NII branches and 
programs, except for benefits for the elderly and disabled. This decrease was 
particularly notable in benefits for the working-age population – child allowances, 
unemployment benefits and income support. 
The cuts in the child allowances continued in 2004, as part of the gradual process of 
equalizing the allowance for all children under the Economy Recovery Law (2003) 
and the special temporary order for 2004-2005.  In 2004 alone payments of child 
allowances decreased by about 21%.  The harshening of conditions of entitlement to 
unemployment benefits continued to affect payments in 2004, when they declined by 
another 13% in real terms.  The cuts in the income support benefit, along with changes 
in the employment test for this benefit, were fully reflected in 2004, when they caused 
a further decrease of about 9.5% in income support payments. 
                                                      
12   Administrative and operative expenses for 2004 are estimated at NIS 1.2 billion. E38  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
In other branches granting benefits to the working-age population – work injury and 
maternity – there was a slight decrease (of about half a percent, in real terms) in 
benefit payments.  In the Work Injury branch, there was a notable real decrease (about 
2%) in expenditure on hostile action casualties, after an over twofold rise (2.3) in 
2001-2003. 
The relative stability in benefit payments of the Maternity branch is the result of two 
opposing trends in the payments of this branch: payments for maternity grant dropped 
sharply (30%) due to legislative changes in August 2003, as did alimony payments (by 
3%) after a 13% decrease in 2003. At the same time, the other payments of this branch 
rose moderately (maternity allowance by 4% and hospitalization grant by 1.5%). 
There was a 1.8% rise in payments of the Old-Age and Survivors branch – even lower 
than the growth in number of recipients.  The payments of old-age and survivors’ 
pensions under the NII Law increased by 3% in real terms, while payments of 
pensions to new immigrants continued to decrease, for the fourth consecutive year – 
by 2.4% in 2004.  Payments of the Long-Term Care branch rose by 0.8%: benefits by 
0.5% and other expenditure by 42%. 
In the Disability branch, which had expanded considerably in 1999-2002 as a result of 
the favorable legislation enacted after the strike of the disabled population, the notable 
slowdown in the growth of benefit payments continued for the second year (1.3% in 
2004). This slowdown reflected not only a more moderate increase in the number of 
recipients, but also the limitation of retroactive payments to 12 months only. This 
limitation applied to all NII benefits, but its influence was greatest in the Disability branch.  
Payments of contributory benefits under the National Insurance Law decreased by 
about 3.2% in real terms in 2004, while payments of non-contributory benefits under 
other state laws or agreements with – and completely financed by – the Treasury (such Trends of Development in National Insurance  E39 
as income support, mobility, alimony, old-age and survivors to new immigrants and 
reserve service) decreased in real terms by a higher rate: 8.8%. The sum of non-
contributory payments amounted to about NIS 8.4 billion in 2004, constituting some 
20% of total benefit payments (as compared to 22.4 in 2002). 
Table 4: Benefit Payments and Collection from the Public (percentages relative 
to the Gross Domestic Product), 1980-2004 
Benefit Payments  Collection from the Public 
Year 
Total   Contributory 




1980 6.09  4.98  6.77  5.15 
1985 7.14  5.51  6.57  4.45 
1990 8.36  7.04  7.21  5.28 
1995 7.69  6.02  8.02  4.49 
2000 8.31  6.62  6.52  4.43 
2001 9.34  7.34  6.87  4.65 
2002 9.38  7.28  6.89  4.68 
2003 8.74  6.91  6.71  4.54 
2004 7.93  6.35  6.51  4.38 
*  Including collection for the sick funds. 
** Including  Treasury indemnification for the reduction of national  insurance  contributions of 
employers. 
Table 5, presenting the distribution of benefit payments by branch, shows that the 
decrease in the share of the Children, Unemployment, Income Support and Reserve 
Service Branches in total payments continued in 2004.  At the same time, the share of 
the other branches, especially that of the two largest branches – Old-Age and 
Survivors and Disability – increased.  54.6% of total benefit payments were 
concentrated in these two branches in 2004. The Disability branch, the third largest 
branch until 2001, replaced the Children branch, and became the second largest 
branch. The share of the  Disability branch rose to 17.2% in 2004, as compared to 
10.5% in the mid 90’s, while benefit payments of the children branch plummeted 
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1.4 Benefit  Level 
The policy of freezing the level of benefits that until January 2002 were linked to the 
average wage continued in 2004. The Economy Recovery Law (June 2003) 
determined that all benefits paid by the NII, except for old-age and survivors’ 
pensions, would not be updated until the end of 2005, and that as of January 2006 
benefit recipients would be compensated by rice rises only.  The old-age and survivors 
pensions were meant to be updated by the rise in the price index in January 2004, but 
prices went down by (0.4%) in 2003;  these pensions will be updated in January 2005 
by 0.9%. In view of the real erosion in the average wage in 2002-2003, it is now clear 
that the policy of freezing the basic benefits at their nominal value had only a 
moderate effect on benefit levels. The accumulated loss from the non-adjustment of 
benefits according to changes in the average wage in 2002-2003 amounted to 2.1% 
(1.2% in 2002 and 0.9% in 2003), but were it not for the policy of freezing benefits, 
their value would have decreased by 2.7% in January 2004. The rise in real wages in 
2004 changed this picture, and in January 2005 the benefits were meant to be updated 
by about 0.6% – even lower than the rate by which the old-age and survivors’ 
pensions were updated, in keeping with price rises (0.9%). The influence of the 
cancellation of linkage to the average wage, and its replacement by adjustment 
according to price rises, will be felt in 2006 and even more in the following years. 
The real level of benefits in 2004 was influenced not only by the policy of freezing 
benefits and by the decline in the average price level in that year, (relative to 2003) but 
also by the fact that in 2004, the effects of benefits cuts implemented in mid-2003 and 
the continued cuts in the child allowances, were felt in full.  
The level of the basic old-age and survivors’ pensions remained relatively stable in 
2004 (rose by about 0.4% due to the decline in the price index by this rate). To sum up 
the years 2002-2004, the basic old-age pension lost about 9.5% of its purchasing E42  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
power while the pensions paid to the elderly entitled to income supplement, as well as 
the survivors’ pensions (not reduced by 4% in 2002) were eroded by a much lower 
rate in real terms: about 5.6%.   
Table  6:  The Old-Age  and Survivors' Pension and the Minimum Income 
Guaranteed to Pension Recipients (constant prices and percentage of 
average wage*), Monthly Average, 1975-2004 
 
Basic old-age & survivors’ pension 
Guaranteed minimum income 
 (including child allowances) 
Single elder 
Widow/er with 2 
children 
Single elder 
Widow/er with 2 

























1975  616.0  14.9  1,023.2  24.8  1,057.6  25.5  1,989.2  48.1 
1980  677.2  13.5  1,312.5  26.3  1,178.6  23.8  2,411.1  48.2 
1985  765.0  15.2  1,481.7  29.5  1,528.9  30.5  3,058.4  61.2 
1990  963.2  15.9  1,863.0  30.7  1,511.7  25.0  3,065.4  50.5 
1995  975.0  15.5  1,889.9  30.1  1,631.7  26.0  3,383.7  53.9 
2000  1,089.0  14.9  2,108.4  28.8  1,819.3  24.9  4,002.7  54.7 
2001  1,180.6  15.8  2,286.9  30.5  1,974.3  26.3  4,326.9  57.7 
2002  1,097.4  15.6  2,169.1  30.8  1,872.4  26.6  3,980.5  56.4 
2003  1,109.5  16.2  2,149.4  31.4  1,855.5  27.1  4,015.2  58.7 
2004  1,114.0  15.8  2,158.0  30.7  1,863.0  26.5  3,985.0  56.7 
*  As measured by the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Developments in the value of benefits relative to the average wage show a different 
picture: Due to the real erosion in wages by about 10% in 2002-2003, there was no 
change in the level of the basic old-age pension relative to the average wage, and the 
minimum guaranteed income to the elderly and survivors even rose in real terms. On Trends of Development in National Insurance  E43 
the other hand, the rise in real wages in 2004 led to an erosion in the relative value of 
the pensions in that year: for example, the basic old-age and survivors’ pension as a 
percentage of the average wage decreased from 16.2% in 2003 to 15.8% in 2004. 
Similar trends were noted in the basic benefits of the Disability branch.  In previous 
years, there was a sharp rise in average benefits (following the implementation of the 
agreements with the disabled organizations), but this rise was halted in 2004, when the 
average level of benefits increased by rates of 0.5% to 1.8% only, in real terms, due 
mainly to slight changes in the composition of the population entitled to the various 
types of disability benefits. 
The cutbacks in the child allowances continued in 2004, when allowances were 
slashed twice: in February, by NIS 24 for every child (from NIS 144 to NIS 120), and 
again in July, when the second stage of equalizing the allowance for all children was 
implemented, and the February reduction was lessened by NIS 4 for the fourth and 
subsequent children.  Furthermore, an allowance of only NIS 120 was paid for “new 
children” born in 2004. The allowance paid to a family with two children decreased by 
about 16% in real terms in 2004 as compared to the previous year (continuing the 
decrease of about 6% in 2003), while the allowance paid to a family with 5 children 
(without “new” children) decreased by about 23% (continuing the decrease of about 
14% in 2003). 
The average long-term care benefit provided to the elderly (the benefit is translated 
into care hours) remained the same in real terms in 2004 (after an erosion of about 5% 
in the previous two years). This stability was noted despite the sharp increase in the 
rate of beneficiaries entitled to the high rate of the benefit, and resulted mainly from 
the 7% reduction in the low rate of the benefit in July 2003. 
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The June 2003 cut in the income support benefit was fully reflected in 2004, and the 
real erosion in the maximum sums of this benefit continued in that year as well. For 
example, the benefit to a single person (under age 55) entitled to the increased rate of 
benefit was eroded by 4% (continuing the erosion of about 9% in 2003), the benefit to 
a single parent with two children plus child allowance was eroded by about 11% 
(continuing the erosion of about 14.5% in 2003), and the benefit to a couple with two 
children was eroded by about 10% (continuing the 15% erosion of 2003). The average 
benefit per family declined by about 8% in real terms in 2004, continuing the decline 
of about 20% in 2003. 
In the branches paying wage-replacing benefits, slight changes were noted in the level 
of the benefits, except for the maternity grant, and these can be attributed to 
developments in wages and in the composition of benefit recipients in 2004. The 
average daily unemployment benefit remained without change in real terms, despite 
the wage rises, due to a moderate increase in the share of the unemployed with low 
wages prior to their unemployment. 
The average daily unemployment benefit decreased from 52% of the average daily 
wages in 2003 to 50.6% in 2004. A similar development was noted regarding the 
average daily maternity allowance: its real level remained the same due to a moderate 
increase in the share of mothers with low wages prior to their giving birth. On the 
other hand, the average maternity grant dropped by 32.5% in real terms in 2004, 
continuing the decline of about 30% in 2003. This drop in the maternity grant is a 
result of the legislation implemented in August 2003 (and in January 2004), according 
to which the grant paid to the 2
nd child was reduced to 9% of the average wage and the 
grant to the 3
rd and subsequent children – to 6% of the average wage (as compared to 
20% of the average wage for the 2
nd to 4
th children and 40% to the 5
th and subsequent 
children prior to the legislation). E46  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
Table 8: Child-Allowance  Point  and  Child  Allowances* (constant  prices and 
percentage of the average wage**), Monthly Average, 1975-2004 
Value of child-
allowance point 
Allowance for 2 
children** 
Allowance for 4 
children 




























1975  181  4.4  364  8.8  1,135  27.4  1,544  37.3 
1980  141  2.8  283  5.6  883  17.7  1,200  24.0 
1985  160  3.1  181  3.6  1,239  24.7  1,760  35.1 
1990  185  2.9  89  1.5  1,435  23.4  2,036  33.2 
1995  180  2.8  360  5.8  1,446  23.4  2,057  33.4 
2000  183  2.5  367  5.0  1,476  20.2  2,101  28.7 
2001  182  2.4  364  4.8  1,462  19.5  2,369  31.6 
2002  172  2.5  306  4.3  1,224  17.3  1,984  28.1 
2003  170  2.4  289  4.2  1,067  15.6  1,704  24.9 
2004  171  2.4  244  3.5  833  11.8  1,313  18.7 
*  Including Special Allowance for Veterans. 
**  As measured by the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
*** The allowance level in 1985-1993 relates to a family (up to 3 children) not eligible for the first child 
allowance, and since October 1990 – for the second child allowance as well. In March 1993 the 
payment of child allowance on a universal basis was renewed. 
Similarly to unemployment benefits and maternity allowance, the injury allowance 
paid in the Work Injury branch remained more or less without change in real terms.  
The average injury allowance paid to employees decreased in real terms by about half 
a percent, while that paid to the self-employed increased by about 4%. The level of the 
work disability pension and the dependents’ pension also remained almost the same – 
a real increase of about half a percent. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E47 
1.5 Benefit  Recipients 
A continued slowdown was noted in 2004 in the growth in benefit recipients in the 
two largest national insurance branches – Old-Age and Survivors and General 
Disability. This trend also characterized the long-term care branch, as well as the 
recipients of disability pension and dependants’ pension in the Work Injury branch. 
However, the numbers of recipients of income support benefit, alimony, and 
unemployment benefits decreased, while the number of children for whom child 
allowance was received remained stable. 
The number of benefit recipients in the Old-Age and Survivors’ branch rose by only 
1.8% in 2004, as compared to an average rise of 2.3% in 2002-2003, and of 3% in 
2001. In 2004, the NII paid pensions to about 722,300 elderly persons and survivors. 
The slowdown in the growth of the number of old-age and survivors beneficiaries, 
noted since the mid 90’s, may be partially explained by the decrease in immigration to 
the country and the ensuing reduction in the number of elderly immigrants. A further 
explanation may be found in the July 2004 implementation of the Retirement Age 
Law, which raised the conditional age of entitlement to old-age pension for both men 
and women, as well as the absolute age of entitlement to pension for women. This 
change too slowed down the growth in the number of pension recipients. 
In the first half of 2004, the number of new recipients of old-age pensions under law 
was about 4,000 as a monthly average. This number has decreased steadily since July 
2004, and particularly in the months of July and August, during which there were only 
500 new pension recipients, as a monthly average. Were it not for the raising of the 
entitlement age, the number of new pension recipients in 2004 would have reached an 
estimated 47,700 men and women, while the actual number was about 28,700. E48  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
As a result of the above changes, the number of recipients of old-age pension under NI 
Law rose in 2004 by 3.2%, as compared to about 4% in each of the previous three 
years. The number of recipients of the special old-age benefit (not under NI law) 
decreased in 2004 for the third year since the wave of immigration of the early 90’s 
and at a higher rate: by 3.8%, as compared to 3% in 2003 and 1.5% in 2002. The 
number of persons receiving survivors’ pension only remained more or less stable, 
similarly to previous years, at about 104,500 widows and widowers. (Those who 
receive old-age pension plus half of their survivor’s pension are counted among the 
recipients of old-age pension). 
The recent significant slowdown in the growth of benefit recipients in the Long-Term 
Care branch – granting in-kind benefits (care hours) to elderly limited in their daily 
functioning – continued from a rate of 10% in 2001 (similar to the previous five 
years), to 6.5% in 2002 and to about half a percent in each of the years 2003-2004. An 
analysis of the entry and exit flows of the long-term care system over the past two 
years shows that the slight growth in benefit recipients in 2003 resulted from a 
decrease in the number of entrants into the system, due, in turn, to a decline (of 10%) 
in the number of claims submitted as well as a moderate decline in the rate of claims 
approved. The rise in the number of entries in 2004 was due to an increase (of 10%) in 
claims (although the rate of approved claims went down in that year as well), while 
the parallel rise in the number of exits resulted from re-examinations of claims at the 
initiative of the NII. 
The continued slowdown in the growth of recipients of benefits from the Disability 
branch encompassed all types of benefits: recipients of general disability pension 
increased by 3.2% in 2004, as compared to 4.5% in 2003 and about 5.7% as in annual 
average for 2000-2002. Moreover, a real slowdown was noted in the number of 
recipients of attendance allowance and mobility allowance, after a sharp rise in these 
numbers due to the legislation expanding the rights of the disabled population Trends of Development in National Insurance  E49 
(following agreements with the organizations of persons with disabilities in 1999-
2000). It should be stressed that the influence of the postponement of the retirement 
age on the number of recipients of benefits for the working-age population – 
particularly general disability pensions, long-term care benefits and income support – 
was hardly felt in 2004, but will be reflected in the coming years. 
In the Children branch, there was a slowdown in 2002-2003 in the growth in the 
number of families receiving child allowances – from 2.3% to 0.4%. This trend was 
halted in 2004, but the rate of growth remained low.  In this year, the number of 
families who received child allowances rose by 0.7%.  At the same time, the number 
of children for whom allowances were received rose by 1%, similarly to 2001-2003. 
Child allowances were paid in 2004 for about 2.23 million children living in some 
942,000 families. 
Regarding wage-replacing benefits, it was found that the steep decline in the number 
of recipients of unemployment benefits continued in 2004, and this number fell to 
about 58,300, as a monthly average, as opposed to about 105,000 in 201. In 2004 only 
about 21% of the non-employed received unemployment benefits, down from about 
45% in 2001. The unemployment rate decreased from about 11% in 2003 to about 
10.4% in 2004, but the number of non-employed remained the same (about 279,000).  
The influence of the 2002 legislation, making conditions of entitlement to 
unemployment benefits stricter, was strong enough to cause a drop in the rate of 
recipients of unemployment benefits over a relatively long period. 
The downward trend in the number of recipients of injury allowance, noted since 
1997, was halted in 2004, when this number rose by about 7% and reached 
approximately 66,000. The rate of recipients of injury allowance out of total 
employed, 4.3% in 1996 (before the frequent amendments to the work injury 
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program), decreased to 2.6% in 2003 and remained at that level in 2004.  It may be  
concluded that the rise in the number of injury allowance recipients resulted from the 
expansion of employment in 2004. It should be noted, too, that the replacement of 
foreign workers by Israeli workers in 2003-2004, particularly in the construction 
industry, could have been expected to have increased the number of recipients of 
injury allowance, since the rate of take-up of rights in the Work Injury branch among 
foreign workers is a very low one. 
In contrast to the rise in the number of recipients of injury allowance, the average 
number of days of work capacity remained stable in 2004 (34 days), as compared to an 
accumulated decrease of about 28% in 2002-2003. The number of recipients of 
(permanent) disability pension in the Work Injury branch increased by about 4.3% in 
2004 (as compared to an annual average increase of about 5% in three preceding 
years), reaching some 23,500. 
The rise in the number of women who received maternity allowance can be explained 
by an expansion in employment in 2003-2004: in both years 2001 and 2003 their 
number rose by only 1%, while in each of the years 2003-2004, it rose by 3.5% and 
about 5% respectively. 
Finally, the new legislation on income support for the working-age population 
implemented in the second half of 2003 was fully reflected only in 2004. The changes 
were not only in the structure of the benefit, but also in the rules of the unemployment 
test, required of almost all claimants, except for parents of children under the age of 
two and other exceptional groups. Even before the amendments to the Income Support 
Law were implemented, a moderation was noted in the rate of growth of the number 
of income support recipients – this rate gradually decreased from 13% in 1998-2000 to 
6.5% in 2002. E52  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
The amendments implemented in 2003 ruled out benefit to about 4,500 families who 
had previously received benefit, and made the entrance of new recipients more 
difficult.  A follow-up of developments in 2003 and 2004 shows that the number of 
recipients decreased gradually and steadily from about 160,000 in the first quarter of 
2003 to about 150,500 in the last quarter of that year. This decrease continued in 2004, 
although at a slower pace and not steadily. The number of benefit recipients rose from 
about 151,600 as a monthly average in 2002 to about 155,000 in 2003 (a 2.6% rise), 
but it decreased to about 145,500 in 2004 (a decrease of about 6.5%).  The 2004 
decrease in the number of recipients characterized mostly single-parent families and 
couples with children. On the other hand, there was a rise in the number of single 
people who received benefit in 2004. 
1.6  Collection of Contributions from the Public and Sources of 
Financing 
The NII benefit payments are financed from four sources: collection of national 
insurance contributions (direct collection from the public as well as Treasury 
indemnification against the reduction in employer and self-employed contribution 
rates); government participation in the financing of contributory benefits; and receipts 
from interest in investments of surpluses in government bonds. In addition to 
collection of national insurance contributions, the NII collects health insurance 
contributions and transfers them to the sick funds. 
Similarly to previous years, collection from the public in 2004 was influenced not only 
by economic developments, but also by the frequent changes in government policy 
regarding the financing of the national insurance and health systems. The restoration 
of the ceiling of income liable for insurance contributions in July 2003 (after it was 
cancelled in July 2002) was fully reflected in 2004 collection. This policy lightened 
the burden of insurance contributions on those employees, employers and the self-Trends of Development in National Insurance  E53 
employed who were in the top percenties of the income distribution. In contrast to this 
policy, a number of legislative changes led to a greater burden of contributions for 
certain population groups, and these changes too were fully reflected in 2004. The 
main changes are: (1) the health contribution rates imposed on members of the 
permanent army were equalized to the rate deducted from worker’s wages (the 2003 
Economy Arrangements Law), and (2) early pensions were made entirely liable for 
national and health insurance contributions at the rates imposed on workers – except 
for national insurance contributions to the unemployment branch (the 2004 Economy 
Arrangements Law). 
The additional collection arising from these two amendments was estimated at about 
NIS 300 million annually, with the share of the health system in this addition being the 
higher one – about 70%. The greater contribution burden entailed by these two 
changes did not affect the low-income population groups. The wages of the permanent 
army members are rather high, and the change regarding early pensions actually 
benefited those with a relatively low pension: those with pension below the average 
wage will pay lower national and health insurance contributions, while the remainder 
of the population will pay higher contributions – sometimes considerably higher (see 
Box 4A in Chapter 4 on collection of contributions by means of the NII). 
Government policy on the adjustment of NII benefits was applied also to the 
collection parameters. In 2002-2004, the average wage under NI Law was not 
updated, and thus nor were the NII the contribution brackets. The average wage will 
continue to remain frozen until the end of 2005, and as of 2006, the ceiling will be 
updated by the rise in the price index only. However, the income brackets for the 
reduces rate and the minimum income for contributions continue to be adjusted in 
accordance with changes in the average wage, even after 2006. The change in the 
method of updating the ceiling will eventually lessen the burden on very high wage-
earners, while those who pay minimum contributions (such as students and the E54  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
unemployed) will be discriminated against. On the other hand, the continued linkage 
of the income brackets for the reduced rate to the average wage will prevent a heavier 
contribution burden being entailed on low wage-earners. 
1.6.1  Collection of Contributions from the Public 
The forecast of 2003 NII collection from the public was confirmed, when total NII 
receipts from national and health insurance contributions from the public amounted to 
NIS 32.9 billion: NIS 21.7 billion to the national insurance branches and NIS 11.2 
billion to the health system. Another NIS 1.4 billion –Treasury indemnification – 
should be added to the sum of collection from the public. 
Collection from the public grew in 2004 by about 2.5% in real terms: national 
insurance contributions by 6.8% and health contributions by 3.8%. Were it not for the 
amendments introduced in mid-2003 and early 2004, collection from the public – as 
well as each of its components – would have risen by an estimated 4.3% in real terms. 
The direct collection of contributions from employees and employers in 2004 was 
influenced by the positive developments the labor force: a rise in real wages and a 
higher (than previous years) growth rate in the number of employed persons – by 
2.1% in real terms. However, the economic recovery of 2004 was not yet felt in 
collection from non-employees, which decreased by 2.2% in real terms. Collection 
from the self–employed (constituting about 82% of total collection from non-
employees) decreased by 5.4% in real terms. Collection from the self-employed in 
2004 was based mainly on 2002 tax assessments, so that we can expect that the 
acceleration in economic activity will be reflected in collection for 2005-2006. On the 
other hand, collection from other non-employees rose by a sharp rate – 30% – mainly 
due to the NII policy of expanding the category of special types of insured persons and 
increasing the scope of collection from them. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E55 
Table 10: Collection for National Insurance Institute & Health System 1999-2004 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
In Current Prices (NIS Million) 
Total receipts from 
contributions  27,412 30,511 32,814 33,995  33,660 34,301 
Total collection from 
public  24,771 27,655 29,724 31,378  32,275 32,941 
For NII branches  16,045  17,893  19,147  20,495  21,424  21,722 
For health system  8,726  9,762  10,577  10,883  10,851  11,219 
Total Treasury 
indemnification  2,641 2,856 3,090 2,617  1,385 1,360 
Indicators of development of collection from the public 
A. Percentage of real change 
Total collection from 
public  4.4 10.4  6.3 -0.1  2.2  2.5 
For NII branches  4.1  10.3  5.8  1.3  3.8  1.8 
For health system  4.9  10.7  7.2  -2.7  -1.0  3.8 
B. As percentage of GDP 
Total collection from 
public  5.8 5.9 6.3 6.4  6.4 6.3 
For NII branches  3.7  3.8  4.0  4.2  4.3  4.1 
For health system  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.1 
C. As percentage of direct taxes to individuals 
Total collection from 
public  35.8 35.1 35.8 37.8  38.9 39.7 
For NII branches  23.2  22.7  23.0  24.7  25.8  26.1 
For health system  12.6  12.4  12.7  13.1  13.1  13.5 
D. As percentage of direct taxes 
Total collection from 
public  29.1 27.0 28.3 30.8  32.5 32.0 
For NII branches  18.9  17.5  18.2  20.1  21.6  21.1 
For health system  10.3  9.5  10.1  10.7  10.9  10.9 
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The data show that in 2004, the trend of increase in the scope of collection from the 
public by means of the NII, in relative to the GDP, was halted, and there was even a 
slight decrease – from 6.4% in 2003 to 6.3% in 2004. On the other hand, the share of 
collection from the public out of total direct taxes from individuals continued to rise 
for the fifth consecutive year, reaching 39.7% in 2004. The share of health 
contributions out of total collection from the public rose from 33.6% in 2003 to 34.1% 
in 2004, due to the differences in the influence of the legislation on national insurance 
and on health insurance contributions. 
1.6.2  Sources of Financing 
Total NII receipts for financing its branches amounted in 2004 to about NIS 47.6 
billion in real prices. This was the third consecutive year in which there was a real 
decrease in the total sources of financing. Receipts from national insurance 
contributions (collection from the public and Treasury indemnification) grew in real 
terms by 1.6%, while government participation in financing insurance branches (under 
article 32 of the NI Law) increased by a higher rate in real terms – by 2.2%. The 
reason for this is that in 2004, the government began financing the increase in the 
benefits to disabled persons in accordance with the 1999-2000 agreements with the 
organizations of persons with disabilities. On the other hand, government financing of 
non-contributory benefits decreased by about 8.8% in real terms, continuing the 11.4% 
decrease of 2003. This decrease stems mainly from the decline in payments of income 
support benefits (both to the working-age population and to the elderly), alimony, and 
benefits to radiation-affected persons paid by the NII, as well as from the sharp 
decrease in payments of reserve service benefits. 
NII receipts from interest on its investments amounted to about NIS 4.6 billion, and in 
2004 they rose by 2.6% in real terms as compared to 2003. Trends of Development in National Insurance  E57 
















3NIS (current prices) 
1995 23,581 12,171  4,222  4,650  2,507 
2000 41,209 20,749  8,336  8,148  3,907 
2001 46,110 22,237  9,952  9,756  4,075 
2002  48,659  23,112 10,520 10,594 4,266 
2003 47,972 22,809  10,802  9,453  4,500 
2004 47,591 23,082  10,996  8,587  4,600 
Real annual growth (percentages) 
2000  7.6  9.8  1.6 10.8 3.6 
2001  10.7  6.0 18.1 18.4 3.2 
2002 -0.2 -1.7  0.0  2.7  -1.0 
2003 -2.1 -2.0  2.0  -11.4  4.8 
2004 -0.4  1.6  2.2  -8.8  2.6 
Distribution (percentages) 
1995 100.0  51.6  17.9  19.7  10.6 
2000  100.0  50.4 20.2 19.8 9.5 
2001  100.0  48.2 21.6 21.2 8.8 
2002  100.0  47.5 21.6 21.8 8.8 
2003  100.0  47.5 22.5 19.7 9.4 
2004  100.0  48.5 23.1 18.0 9.7 
*  Including Treasury indemnification. E58  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
The share of government financing of non-contributory benefits continued to fall in 
2004, down to 18.0% of total financing sources, whereas government participation in 
financing the insurance branches went up to 23.1%. Receipts from independent 
sources – insurance contributions and maximum income – increased from 56.9% in 
2003 to 58.2% in 2004. 
1.6.3  Surpluses/Deficits and Financial Reserves 
Government policy in 2002-2004 was reflected in the gradual shrinking of the current 
deficit in NII activities in 2002-2003, and even in slight surplus in 2004. If income 
from interest on NII investments is not taken into account, the deficit was reduced 
since 2001 by over NIS 3.6 billion and in 2004 there was even a surplus of about NIS 
230 million.  In 2004 alone the deficit was reduced by more than NIS 1.7 billion. 
Table 12: Surpluses/Deficit in National Insurance Branches, 2001-2004 
 
Surplus/Deficit Without 
Interest on Investments 
Surplus/Deficit Including 
Interest on Investments  Insurance Branch 
2001  2003  2004  2001  2003  2004 
NIS million (current prices) 
Total  -3,420  -1,526  230  657  2,974  4,830 
Old-age & survivors  -633  -930  -1,156  1,019  1,010  804 
General disability  -1,762  -2,962  -2,634  -912  -2,202  -2,014 
Work injury  -1,193  -897  -833  -821  -587  -563 
Maternity  -852  -940  -941  -674  -830  -876 
Children  5,338  7,737  9,031  5,890  8,717  10,401 
Unemployment  -3,090  -2,076  -1,739  -3,090  -2,076  -1,739 
Long-term care  -1,410  -1,522  -1,553  -1,049  -1,262  -1,364 
Other  182  64  55  294  204  181 Trends of Development in National Insurance  E59 
This trend is expected to continue in the coming years. The reduction of the current 
deficit over the past three years was particularly notable in the Work Injury and 
Unemployment branches, and in parallel, the current surplus in the Children branch 
increased, reaching about NIS 9 billion in 2004. Even in branches in which the current 
deficit continued to grow, this growth was much more moderate in the past year.  
Moreover, the sharp growth in the deficit that had characterized the General Disability 
branch in recent years was reduced by about NIS 300 million in 2004.   
The improvement in the NII’s financial situation is also noted when taking income 
from interest on past surpluses into consideration: total surpluses, including interest, 
increased from about NIS 660 million in 2001 to NIS 2.97 billion in 2003 and to about 
NIS 4.83 billion in 2004. Deficits remained in all the branches with the exception of 
Children and Old-Age and Survivors. The assets of the Unemployment branch ran out 
in 1999, and since then the branch has been financed entirely from the Children 
branch. The elimination of the current deficit from the NII budget is naturally 
expressed in a reduction of the deficit in the State budget. E60  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
Diagram H: The National Insurance Institute - Resources and Uses
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 2.1 Introduction 
As part of research carried out in Israel on poverty and income distribution, a relative 
approach to measuring poverty was formulated in the early 1970s, in line with that 
accepted by the majority of researchers and social policymakers in the Western world. 
According to this approach, poverty is an expression of relative distress that should be 
evaluated relative to the standard of living typical of a given society: a family is 
considered poor not only when it is unable to purchase a basic basket of products 
necessary for its subsistence, but also when its living conditions are significantly 
inferior to those of society as a whole. The relative approach further recognizes that 
distress is not only reflected in low income, but may also be expressed in level of 
assets, housing conditions, education and public services available. Nevertheless, 
since there is no agreed index that takes into account all the constituent aspects of 
distress, and since the National Insurance Institute possesses data (from Central 
Bureau of Statistics Income Surveys) only for the current income of households in 
Israel, poverty is measured solely as a function of the latter. The relative approach 
offers several operative methods for measuring poverty based on the level of income 
which rely, as a common denominator, on a comparison of the level of income of 
families on the lowest scale of income with the level of income of all other families. 
Each method is predicated on a “poverty line” set as a percentage of the income which 
is “representative” of society. A family whose income is below the poverty line will 
be considered poor, without this necessarily implying that the family suffers from 
want in the form of hunger, malnutrition, threadbare clothing or dilapidated housing, 
but only that its income is significantly lower than the representative income. 
In Israel, the method for measuring poverty is based on the following three principles: 
a.  The first principle views the family’s net income as the relevant income for 
assessing poverty. Net income is defined as the family’s market income (from 
work as well as from ownership of physical production means and financial assets) 66E  Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel 
plus transfer payments (received not in return for economic efforts, such as 
national insurance benefits or support from institutions and individuals in Israel 
and abroad), less direct taxes (income tax, national insurance contributions and 
health insurance contributions). 
b.  The second principle regards the median net income of the population as the 
society’s representative income. Median income is defined as the level of income 
which 50% of families have at least that income, while the remaining 50% have a 
higher level of income. The poverty line is defined as the level of income 
equivalent to 50% of the median net income. A family whose net income is lower 
than one half of the median net income is thus regarded as poor.
1 Economic 
growth leading to an increase in the median net income also results in the raising 
of the poverty line. A non-poor family whose net income has increased by less 
than the rate of increase of the poverty line may thus become a poor family. 
c.  The third principle adjusts the poverty line to the family size. This principle is 
based on the assumption that family size involves economics of scale, whereby the 
growth of a family by an additional person increases its needs not by an 
equivalent, but rather by a lesser, proportion. In other words, the additional income 
required by a family in order to maintain a fixed standard of living decreases with 
the increase in the number of family members. To enable a comparison between 
the standard of living of families of different sizes, an “equivalence scale” was 
developed by which the needs of each such family can be measured against the 
needs of a family of a given basic size. More specifically, the equivalence scale 
translates the number of persons in a family into the number of “standard” persons 
(or the number of “standard adults”) in that family (Table 1). The scale is based on 
a two-member family which is assigned a value of two standard persons. 
                                                           
1     The median income is preferable to the average income, as representing the typical 
standard of living, since the latter is affected by extreme values in income distribution (i.e. 
by very high or very low incomes). Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel   E67 
According to this scale, a family with one member has a value of 1.25 standard 
persons. In other words, the needs of a one-member family are not assessed as 
equivalent to one half the needs of a two-member family, but as greater. Similarly, 
the needs of a four-member family (which has a value of 3.2 standard persons) are 
not set at double the needs of a two-member family (which has a value of 2 
standard persons), but at less than double (only 1.6 times greater). 
In keeping with these principles, the poverty line per standard person in Israel was set 
at 50% of the median net income per standard person. A family in Israel is classified 
as poor if its net income, divided by the number of standard persons in the family, is 
lower than the poverty line per standard person. The poverty line per family can be 
calculated in a similar manner – by multiplying the poverty line per standard person 
by the number of standard persons in the family. 
Table  1:  Number of Standard Persons and the Poverty Line per Family,   
by Number of Family Members, 2003  






percentage of the 
average wage  NIS per month 
1 1.25   25.3   1,736  
2 2.00   40.6   2,777  
3 2.65   53.7   3,680  
4 3.20   64.9   4,443  
5 3.75   76.0   5,207  
6 4.25   86.2   5,901  
7 4.75   96.3   6,595  
8 5.20   105.5   7,220  
9 5.60   113.6   7,776  68E  Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel 
As already indicated, the Annual Income Surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) serve as the basis for calculating the dimensions of poverty and 
income inequality in Israel. Up until 1997 (inclusive), the survey population included 
households whose head was an employee or non-working person, in urban localities 
with 2,000 or more inhabitants (excluding East Jerusalem)
2. In 1998 the Central 
Bureau of Statistics decided to produce a combined Income Survey, based on both the 
current Income Survey and the Family Expenditures Survey. The combined Income 
Survey is based on a larger sample (1.8 times the previous sample) and encompasses 
95% of all households in Israel in most forms of settlement. In addition to the 
employee and non-working populations in urban localities, the combined Income 
Survey also covers the self-employed population, the population in the moshavim and 
in rural and community localities, and the inhabitants of East Jerusalem.
3 However, in 
2000-2001 the inhabitants of East Jerusalem were not included in the survey, due to 
difficulties in data collection. For comparison purposes, the 2003 data were 
reproduced with East Jerusalem. 
The present summary surveys the dimensions of poverty and income inequality in 
Israel in 2002-2003 on the basis of the combined Income Survey, and presents the 
main findings regarding the impact of transfer payments and direct taxes in reducing 
their scope. The dimensions of poverty are expressed by means of the two most 
widely used aggregate poverty indices in empirical studies, both in Israel and abroad: 
the poverty incidence and the poverty gap. The poverty incidence index indicates the 
scope of poverty in terms of the percentage of poor families in the total population. 
The poverty gap index reflects the depth of poverty: the poverty gap of a poor family 
is defined as the difference between the poverty line (corresponding to the family’s 
                                                           
2     Up until 1994 (inclusive), the Income Surveys included non-Jewish localities with                   
10,000 or more inhabitants (excluding East Jerusalem). Since 1995, the Income Surveys 
have been expanded to include non-Jewish localities numbering 2,000–10,000 inhabitants.  
3   The populations not yet included are mainly the kibbutzim and the Beduin inhabitants who 
do not reside in permanent localities.  Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel   E69 
size) and the family’s actual income, while the poverty gap of the population as a 
whole is defined as the sum of the poverty gaps of the total number of poor families in 
the population. The poverty gap index can be standardized and defined as the ratio 
between the average poverty gap per poor family and the poverty line (hereafter, the 
“poverty gap ratio”). Income inequality among the entire population is measured by 
the GINI index. 
2.2  Poverty in 2003 as Compared to 2002 
In 2003 the scope of poverty in Israel expanded. The rate of families whose net 
income fell under the poverty line rose from 18.1% in 2002 to 19.3% in 2003. This 
development is in contrast to the stability that characterized the poverty rate since 
1997
4. 
The rise in the rate of poor families according to net income in 2003 is also in contrast 
to the stability characterizing this year in the rate of poor families according to 
economic income (before transfer payments and taxes). Similarly to 2002, in 2003 
33.9% of all families had an economic income lower than the poverty line. This 
stability can be at least partially explained by the expansion in employment that 
characterized even the traditional branches, as well as by the stability noted for the 
second year in the real level of the minimum wage – in contrast to the erosion of 
actual wages.  
The expansion of the poverty rate by net income was also noted among persons and 
children; the rate of poor persons out of total persons in the population rose from 
21.1% to 22.4%, while the rate of poor children out of total children in the population 
rose from 29.6% to 30.8%. The increase in the rate of poor children in 2003 continued 
                                                           
4   For the population that does not include the residents of East Jerusalem the trends are 
similar, although the gap in poverty rate between the two populations has diminished.  70E  Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel 
the gradual upward trend that occurred in the years 1999-2002. The poverty rate of 
children in 1998 was 22.8%.  
The rise in the poverty rate by net income characterized all population groups, 
although it was not statistically significant (at a level of up to 5%
5) in all these groups. 
The poverty rate among families headed by an elderly person rose from 19% in 2002 
to 22.3% in 2003, and among families with children – from 21.7% to 23%. Among 
single-parent families, the rate of poverty increased from 25.3% to 27.6%. The rise 
was a more moderate one among large families and non-Jewish families. The erosion 
in the child allowances to large families will be reflected only in data of the 2004 
Survey. 
The increase in the poverty rate did not skip over working families. For example, the 
rate of single-earner families with a net income below the poverty line grew from 
17.6% to 18.6%. 
Similarly to 2002, poor families became poorer in 2003, and their average income 
drew further away from the poverty line. The average poverty gap per family 
continued to rise in 2003, reaching 30.5% of the poverty line, as compared to 29.7% in 
2002.  
The increase in the poverty gap characterized all population groups, except for 
working families, and was especially prominent in non-working families of working 
age. The decline in the poverty gap of working families can be attributed to the 
increase in the income of the working poor, due to the addition of more workers to the 
poverty ranks or/and due to the stability in the minimum wage. On the other hand, the 
rise in the poverty gap among non-working families stems from the erosion in the 
level of benefits paid to the working-age population.  
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Table 2: Poverty in Total Population, by Selected Poverty Measures  




 direct taxes 
After transfer 
payments 







  2002 
Poor population       
Families  634,000   339,000    
Persons  2,079,000   1,321,500    
Children  828,200   617,600    
Incidence of poverty (%)       
Families     33.9   18.1   46.6  
Persons  33.2   21.1   36.4  
Children  39.7   29.6   25.4  
Poverty gap ratio (%)*  66.6   29.7   55.4  
  2003 
Poor population  645,300   366,300    
       Families  2,156,200   1,426,800    
       Persons  862,200   652,400    
       Children       
Incidence of poverty (%)       
       Families     33.9   19.3   43.1  
       Persons  33.8   22.4   33.7  
       Children  40.7   30.8   24.3  
Poverty gap ratio (%)*  64.8   30.5   52.9  
*  The weight given to each family in calculating the measure is equivalent to the number 
of persons in the family. 
In 2003, the contribution of the transfer payments to the reduction of poverty declined; 
the rate of poor families after transfer payments and taxes was about 43% lower than 72E  Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel 
the rate of poor according to economic income – compared to a parallel rate of about 
47% in 2002. The poor non-working population (elderly and working age), as well as 
workers whose income is below the tax threshold, suffered from erosion in their 
benefits
6, but naturally, did not benefit at all from tax reductions; thus their situation 
deteriorated in relation to that of the working population. Furthermore, the erosion of 
benefits more than set off the slight improvement in the economic income of the poor 
and the positive effect of the lowering of taxes, particularly of national insurance 
contributions.  
2.3  Inequality in Income Distribution in 2003 as Compared to 2002 
The picture of income gaps that arises from the data of the 2003 Income Survey 
indicates two contrasting developments: while the gaps in the distribution of economic 
income grew smaller, those in the distribution of net income grew slightly wider. The 
Gini index of economic income distribution declined by about 2%, but the index of net 
income distribution rose slightly – by half a percent. 
The significance of these findings is that in 2003, the contribution of the benefits and 
direct taxes to the reduction of gaps in net income decreased, and that the decline in 
inequality in economic income was not translated into a parallel decline in inequality 
in net income. Taken together, in 2003 the transfer payments and taxes reduced the 
Gini index of the distribution of economic income by 30%, as compared to 31.5% in 
2002.  
A more detailed analysis shows that the economic income per standard person (on 
average in a family) declined in real terms by about 3%, while the decline in the two 
                                                           
6   Datails of the cuts in National Insurance benefits in the framework of the government 
economic policy in 2002-2003 are described in the Annual Survey of the NII for 2002-
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upper deciles was higher – by 4.5% and 6%, respectively
7. On the other hand, the net 
income per standard person decreased by about 1.5% in real terms, the rate of decrease 
being higher in the five lower deciles – between 3.9% in the lowest decile to 2% in the 
fifth decile
8. The net income per standard person remained the same in the 3
rd to 9
th 
deciles, but decreased by about 2% in the top decile. 












and taxes  
 Total population         
2003 0.5265  0.3685  30.0  
2002 0.5372  0.3679  31.5  
1999 0.5167  0.3593  30.5  
Change in Gini Index (%)    
2003 compared to 2002  -2.0   0.2   
2003 compared to 1999  1.9   2.6   
                                                           
7   The sharp decline in economic income of the top decile in 2003 as compared to 2002 was 
influenced by a small number of exceptional cases (of a very high income) in the 2002 
sample. A sensitivity test of the real change in the income of the top decile and of the Gini 
index of the distribution of the general income shows that omission of these cases 
moderates the changes to a great extent.  
8   The weight given to each family in the calculation of income per standard person is equal 
to the number of persons in the family. When each family is weighted, the economic 
income per standard person decreases by 2% and the net income per standard person 
remains the same in real terms. However, even in this case the patterns of income change 
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The decrease in economic income reflects the wage erosion, more notable in the upper 
deciles, while the slight decrease in net income reflects the erosion in benefit levels, 
since the reduction of income tax increased net income. The share of each of the five 
low deciles as well as of the top decile in total net income declined, while the share of 
the 6
th to 9
th deciles rose. The ratio between the income of the top quintile and that of 
the bottom quintile rose slightly: from 7.0% to 7.1%.  
An appendix of bilingual tables and graphs appears at the end of the second chapter. 